Part 3 – Claims for Damages: “Substantial Compliance”
Before its amendment in 2009, RCW 4.92.100 stated that “With respect to the content of such claims, this section shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance will be deemed satisfactory.” Similarly, RCW 4.96.010(1) (which was not amended in 2009) provides that “The laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.”
Based on the language of these statutes, Washington courts required substantial compliance with the “content” requirements of RCW 4.92.100 and RCW 4.96.020. See Medina v. Public Utility Dist. No. 1, 147 Wn.2d 303, 53 P.3d 993 (2002); Reyes v. City of Renton, 121 Wn. App. 498, 86 P.3d 155 (2004). On the other hand, these cases required strict compliance with claim filing procedures on the basis that filing a claim is a condition precedent to commencing an action seeking damages from governmental entities. Medina v. Public Utility Dist. No. 1, supra; Reyes v. City of Renton, supra. As explained by the court in Reyes:
Although the claim filing statutory scheme authorizes substantial compliance with the laws specifying the content of the notice of claims, strict compliance is clearly emphasized with the filing procedures themselves. Failure to strictly comply with statutory filing requirements leads to dismissal of the action. Reyes v. City of Renton, 121 Wn. App. at 502 (citations omitted).
The application of this strict compliance rule sometimes led to harsh results. For example, in the Medina case, the court affirmed the dismissal of a personal injury case brought by a motorist against a county public utility district on the basis that the he had failed to strictly comply with the 60-day waiting period between presentation of his tort claim to the utility district and the commencement of his action in the superior court. The 2009 amendments to the claim statutes overrule the strict compliance rules cases, and now provide that “[w]ith respect to the content of claims under this section and all procedural requirements in this section, this section must be liberally construed so that substantial compliance will be deemed satisfactory.” RCW 4.92.100(3); RCW 4.96.020(5) (emphasis added). Presumably, cases addressing what constitutes substantial compliance for purposes of the claim statutes still remain good law after the 2009 amendments. For example, in Renner v. City of Marysville, 145 Wn. App. 443, 187 P.3d 283 (2008), the court held that, for purposes of the claim-filing statutes for tort claims, the substantial compliance rule has two necessary conditions: first, there must be a sufficient bona fide attempt by the claimant to comply with the law even though the attempt may be defective in some particular, and, second, the attempt at compliance must actually accomplish the statutory purpose of the claim statutes, which is to give governmental entities sufficient notice to enable them to investigate the cause and character of the injury.